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Croatian Pretensions to Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1848
Abstract: Since the early 1860s many Croat politicians, both prominent (from Ante 
Starčević and Ante Pavelić to Franjo Tudjman) and little known, have been openly 
expressing the ambition to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia at a favourable 
moment and under certain conditions, invoking Croatian state and historical right 
in support of their pretensions. These pretensions, born out of the belief that the 
unfortunately shaped territory of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia lacks the necessary 
strategic depth, have led to a fully-fledged strategy for creating an ethnically and re-
ligiously pure Greater Croatia and to constant conflict with the Serb side which also 
lays claims, predominantly ethnic, to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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The alarmist thesis about the Serbs’ purported hegemonic intentions and aspirations for a Greater Serbia, coming from Croatia for more than 
a century and a half, has been a leitmotif threaded through every anti-Serb 
public statement or action both at home and abroad.1 It seeks to depict both 
the Serbs as a group and Serbia as territorially insatiable aggressors, while 
concealing own aggression and own, ethnically and historically unfounded, 
pretensions to someone else’s territories. Although not new in Croatian 
politics, this tactic has not been given due attention and explanation in his-
toriography. It is, in fact, a legacy of Austria-Hungary, whose vilification of 
the Serb aspiration for freedom and unification was directly proportionate 
to its territorial appetites in the Balkans and its growing support for the 
German policy of eastward expansion. Austria-Hungary invariably labelled 
whatever was Serbian as Greater Serbian in order to nip in the bud any at-
tempt of the Serbs to pursue their interests, which were at variance with its 
own. This tradition of Austro-Hungarian politics, in which Croats partici-
pated and frequently led the way, has been perpetuated and Serbian politics 
denounced and invariably branded as being Greater Serbian in all historical 
1 For this see Izvori velikosrpske agresije, ed. B. Čović (texts by Miroslav Brandt, Bože 
Čović, Slaven Letica, Radovan Pavić, Zdravko Tomac, Mirko Valentić and Stanko 
Žuljić) (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1991). To the same category of publications belong 
Mirko Grmek, Mare Djidara & Neven Šimac, Le nettoyage ethnique. Documents his-
toriques sur une idéologie serbe (Librairie Arthèma Fayard, 1993) and Stjepan Murgić, 
Tomislav Bogdanić & Stipan Budimir, Kontrapunkt slobode (Zagreb: Pisanni Nikkal, 
1997).
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periods since the 1848 revolution. Attacking Serbism and Greater Serbism, 
which they saw as the main rival to Croatism and Greater Croatism, Croat 
politicians were not just fantasizing about a Greater Croatia, they worked 
towards that end persistently and consistently, convinced that all means are 
permitted, including the genocidal annihilation of Serbs.
The aspiration for Croatia’s territorial enlargement is of an older date. 
Numerically not too strong and territorially small, the Croat people har-
boured imperial ambitions. This can be clearly seen from the names such as 
“Alpine or Mountain Croats” (Slovenes); “Orthodox Croats” (Serbs); “indis-
putable Croats” or “the jewel of the Croat people” (Muslims); or “Turkish 
Croatia”, “Red Croatia”, “White Croatia” and “Carantanian Croatia”, refer-
ring to parts of Bosnia, to Montenegro, Dalmatia and Slovenia respectively. 
Over time, these appellations have been carefully nurtured and planted into 
the minds of Croats in order to instigate their belief in the greatness of 
Croatia and the great numerical strength of the Croat population.
Imbro Ignjatijević Tkalac warns as early as 1866 that states cannot 
be founded “on old title deeds and ‘virtual’ territorial claims”; but a policy 
premised on state and historical right could not be other than Greater Cro-
atian. In 1861, the Croatian Diet invokes Croat state and historical right 
to raise the claim of the Triune Kingdom to a portion of the Slavic lands 
and to its provinces in the Ottoman Empire — i.e. to Bosnia and Her-
zegovina — which should be reunited with the Triune Kingdom in the 
process of settling the “Eastern question”.2 In 1878–81, the Diet hails the 
Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and expresses 
hopes that conditions may be created for joining Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na to the Triune Kingdom within the dualist Habsburg Monarchy.3 Don 
Mihovil Pavlinović hails the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, hopeful that these lands may soon be annexed to Croatia, 
and is disappointed when his hopes proved illusory.4 The scale of territorial 
ambitions premised on Croat state and historical right can be seen from the 
article “What is the true Croat policy and who is its proponent” published 
in the newspaper of the Party of Right [Stranka prava / SP] Hrvatska (no. 
2 Spisi saborski i sabora kraljevinah Dalmacije, Hrvatske i Slavonije od god. 1861, ed. and 
pub. by Bar. Dragojlo Kušlan and Dr. Mirko Šuhaj (Zagreb 1862), vol. II, 32–34: I 16.
3 Vladimir Ćorović, “Srbi i Hrvati prema bosansko-hercegovačkom pitanju”, in Srpski 
pisci i naučnici o Bosni i Hercegovini, ed. Z. Antonić (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1995), 
196 and 197; Mirjana Gross, Izvorno pravaštvo. Ideologija, agitacija, pokret (Zagreb: 
Golden marketing, 2000), 346.
4 Dragutin Pavličević, “Mihovil Pavlinović o istočnom pitanju i bosanskohercegovačkom 
ustanku 1860–1878”, in Mihovil Pavlinović u politici i književnosti, ed. N. Stančić (Za-
greb 1990), 201– 202.
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6, 1871): “The lands encompassed by the state right of the Croats, by history 
and by nationality, stretch: from Germany to Macedonia, from the Danube 
to the [Adriatic] sea, and the names of the present-day individual provinces 
are: Southern Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorizia, Istria, Croatia, Slavonia, 
Krajina [Military Frontier], Dalmatia, Upper Albania, Montenegro, Her-
zegovina, Bosnia, Rascia, Serbia — and all these go by one true name: the 
State of Croatia. These lands extend over more than 4,000 square miles, and 
the population numbers up to 8 million souls.”
The stance held by Hrvatska was not lonely. It was not the product 
of an irresponsible journalist or politician. Nor did it reflect a passing trend. 
Rather, it was the natural result of a deep-rooted and widely accepted belief. 
As early as 1869 Eugen Kvaternik, a key figure of the Party of Right along 
with Ante Starčević, writes to Mihovil Pavlinović that, should their party 
policy be followed, should Croat state and historical right be acknowledged, 
then “soon the flag of pure, unspoiled Croatia will fly, not from the Drava to 
the sea but from the Salzburg-Tyrol Alps to Kosovo and Albania!”5 Kvater-
nik’s Greater Croatian ambitions — which covered Styria, Carniola, Gori-
zia and Istria, almost all of Bosnia “as far as Mt Romanija and Višegrad, and 
half of [H]Erzegovina, as far as the rivers Neretva and Buna” — were clearly 
stated in his book La Croatie et la confédération italienne (Paris 1859), and 
were the reason why his contemporary, Alexander Hilferding, a renowned 
Russian historian, ethnographer and linguist, levelled harsh criticisms at the 
book, arguing that no historical right could entitle the Croats to take the 
lands that were not theirs, that it would be sheer robbery inevitably pushing 
the kindred Slavic peoples into a conflict. 
Carefully analyzing Kvaternik’s text, Hilferding comes to the conclu-
sion that the Croats have set themselves the goal of taking control of the 
neighbouring areas with the assistance of Western Europe. That is why they 
are humble before Western Europe, and “arrogant and intolerant towards 
their fellow Slavs”. Hilferding advises the Croats “not to humiliate them-
selves before Western Europe and not to harbour arrogance and intolerance 
towards their fellow Slavs, but a sense of unity and love”.6 Hilferding’s well-
intentioned message, imbued in pan-Slavic feelings, received no response 
from those it was addressed to.
Driven by expansionist territorial ambitions and “armed” with state 
and historical right, the “Croat academic youth”, behind whom stood the 
father of the homeland, Ante Starčević, saw not only Bosnia and Herzegov-
5 E. Kvaternik to M. Pavlinović, Zagreb, 22 June 1869, reproduced in V. Krestić, Gradja 
o Srbima u Hrvatskoj, 1848–1914 (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1995), vol. I, 143–144.
6 Hilferding’s review was originally published in the Russkaia beseda in 1860, and the 
Belgrade-based Srbske novine brought a translation in a separate issue.
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ina as Croat lands, but also “the whole of Albania, and the whole of Rašija 
[Raška/Rascia], and the whole of upper Moesia or present-day Serbia”.7 A 
proponent of this policy, which Franjo Rački termed “specific Croatism”, 
writes that “the Croatian king is called upon to set a cross on the church of 
St Sophia in Constantinople”.8
In late 1875 Croatian university students of Starčevićan orientation, 
stating that Bosnia and Herzegovina are the hinterland of Dalmatia and 
belong among the lands of the crown of Zvonimir, publish a map titled: 
“Croatian state, published on the occasion of the 800th anniversary of the 
coronation of Zvonimir, king of all Croats”. Apart from what then was the 
Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, the map also encompasses 
Istria, Carinthia, Carniola, most of Styria, Bosnia and Herzegovina as far 
as the Drina, as well as the area that would be incorporated into Montene-
gro in 1878.9 In his geography of Bosnia published in 1878, the historian 
Vjekoslav Klaić, a sympathizer of the Party of Right, describes the popula-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Croat, including the “Mohammedan 
Croats”. Referring to the “Christian Croats” (i.e. Roman Catholics) and the 
“Eastern-Greek Croats” (i.e. Serbs), he says that they lost their free will as a 
result of centuries of enslavement.10 
In the book Croat Nationality or the Soul of the Croat People [Hrvatska 
narodnost iliti duša hrvatskog naroda] published in 1879, the well-known 
Croatian author Djuro Deželić, a follower of the Party of Right, states that 
the following provinces are inhabited by Croats and “therefore [are] Croa-
tian: all of present-day Dalmatia with Boka Kotorska [Gulf of Kotor], the 
vilayet of Bosnia, i.e. Bosnia with Turkish Croatia and the Pashalik of Novi 
Pazar (Rascija), present-day Herzegovina, which up to the source of the 
Neretva was called Turkish Dalmatia as early as 1789, when Engel11 was 
writing his history, and finally, Montenegro with Northern Albania”.12 
The pretensions to Bosnia and Herzegovina were so strong that bish-
op Strossmayer wrote an embittered letter to Rački in 1878: “Our people 
7 Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia], Pokloni i otkupi [Gifts and Purchases], b. LX, no. 
39, Open letter to the learned Mr Maikov, Moscow University teacher, Zagreb, 25 Jan. 
1877; I. Šidak, “Prilozi povijesti ranog pravaštva”, Historijski zbornik XXV–XXVI (Za-
greb 1972–73), 281–303.
8 Franjo Rački to Vatroslav Jagić, 22 Sept. 1876, in V. Jagić, Spomeni mojega života, vol. I 
(1838–1880) (Belgrade: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1930), 324.  
9 Gross, Izvorno pravaštvo, 331.
10 Vjekoslav Klaić, Bosna. Podatci o zemljopisu i poviesti (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 
1878).
11 Historian Johann Christian Engel (1770–1814).
12 See pp. 179 and 180 of Deželić’s book. 
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stare at Bosnia and Herzegovina like a stork at its egg, forgetting that our 
entire inner logic is against it. How can you expect to be liberated by the one 
who’d like to drown us in a drop of water…”13 
Less than twenty years earlier, Strossmayer, still not disillusioned with 
Austria and its policy towards Croatia and Croats, seeks, in his confidential 
memoranda to the Austrian minister-president Count Johann Rechsberg, 
to motivate political factors in Vienna to engage more actively in resolving 
the Eastern Question, suggesting that Bosnia and Herzegovina would, with 
the help of Croats and the Military Frontier, “fall into their hands like a ripe 
plum”.14 The bishop’s offer of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria was mo-
tivated by his wish for them to be wrested from the Ottoman Empire and 
annexed to Croatia when it would become possible. In 1879, he writes to 
Marijan Marković, bishop of Banjaluka: “What is Bosnia’s is Croatia’s, and 
what is Croatia’s is Bosnia’s.”15 If one remembers that Strossmayer based his 
entire politics on Croat state and historical right, his position on the issue 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes easy to understand.
The Greater Croatian aspirations are obvious in the programmes of 
the Party of Right too. The first article of the party programme adopted 
at the party convention held in Zagreb on 26 June 1891, and signed by 
Ante Starčević with his 250 followers, states: “The Party of Right will, on 
the grounds of state right and the nationality principle, use all legal means 
to have the Croat people, who lives in Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, in 
Rijeka with the kotar [district] and in Medjumurje, Bosnia, Herzegovina 
and Istria, united into a single state body within the Habsburg Monarchy, 
and it will support with all its might the striving of the fellow Slovenes for 
the Slovenian lands to join this state body.”16 The first article of the 1894 
party programme states: “Croat state and natural right must be exercised: by 
establishing the wholeness of the kingdom of Croatia through the unification 
of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Rieka, Medjumurje, Bosnia, Herzegovina, 
Istria, Carniola, Carinthia and Styria within the Habsburg Monarchy.”17
13 Ibid.
14 V. Krestić, “Koncepcije Josipa Jurja Štrosmajera o istočnom pitanju”, Istraživanja 5 
(Novi Sad 1976), 400.
15 Ivan Mužić, Hrvatska politika i jugoslavenska ideja (Split 1969), 29.
16 Iso Kršnjavi, Zapisci. Iza kulisa hrvatske politike (Zagreb 1986), vol. II, 462.
17 Dr Sime Mazzura & Dr Marijan Derenčin, Programi oporbenih stranaka u Hrvatskoj 
(reproduced from the Obzor) (Zagreb 1894), 12 (italics mine). August Harambašić, a 
noted Croat poet and prominent member of the Party of Right, in a speech he gave 
in 1890, expected the cheer “Long live Croatia!” would resound from Triglav to the 
Timok, and from the Soča to the Balkans.
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The formulation “establishing the wholeness of the kingdom of Cro-
atia” and uniting it with the cited regions implies that these regions used to 
be united at some point in the past. However, the desire to create a Greater 
Croatia led the Party of Rights to falsify the past, and not only in this pro-
gramme but also in a number of other cases. Croatian territorial claims cov-
ered three categories of lands. One encompassed those that constituted the 
“real extent”, or what then was Croatia and Slavonia with the city of Rijeka 
and its environs; a second encompassed the lands claimed on the grounds 
of the so-called virtual right: Medjumurje, Dalmatia, the Kvarner Islands, a 
part of Istria, and parts of north-eastern Bosnia; while a third encompassed 
the lands that Greater Croatian circles wished to see as part of Croatia on 
the grounds of “Croat state and historical right”. The 1894 programme of 
the Party of Right included Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and all of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, even though they had never formed part of Croatia. Any-
way, in the second half of the nineteenth century the project for the phased 
creation of a Greater Croatia was fully developed, so that in the subsequent 
decades, strategies and tactics for achieving the objective needed only to be 
elaborated and supplemented.
In late 1902 the well-known Croatian politician, jurist and author 
Marijan Derenčin, advocating the expansion of Croatia, is ready to declare 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while generously acknowledg-
ing Serbia’s right to expand towards the south.18
In early 1908, Iso Kršnjavi, a prominent member of the Pure Party of 
Right [Čista stranka prava / ČSP], makes a suggestion to Zanantoni, chief 
of staff to the Zagreb-stationed corps, that “for the dynasty and monarchy 
to forever have an unconditionally reliable and safe stronghold in all direc-
tions, towards the inside and towards the outside, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
should be united into a single state body with Croatia, Slavonia and Dal-
matia, and placed under the administration of an absolutely reliable person 
who would carry out Bosnia’s transition to a constitutional system in a way 
similar to how Count Pejačević, as ban and commissioner, annexed the Mil-
itary Frontier of Croatia back in his time”.19 As for Kršnjavi, he believes that 
the Greater Croatia idea is nothing other than “a bit shrunken Yugoslav 
18 Iso Kršnjavi (Zapisci, 234–235) reacted in the following way: “So, the merryman 
[Derenčin] is giving us Bosnia, plus the right to expand westwards. We haven’t even 
fully digested the Military Frontier yet, and the Serbs who came with it, so what would 
we do with the Serbs in Bosnia? ‘Septemvirize’ them too? Bosnia hasn’t been formally 
ceded to our monarchy yet, there the sultan is sovereign. How has Dr. Derenčin come to 
appropriate someone else’s property? — He’d say: Sultan, so what! Bosnia’s ours!”
19 Kršnjavi, Zapisci, 510.
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idea” which is easier to fulfil than the ambitious Yugoslav idea.20 In 1909, to 
smooth the way for Croatia to take hold of Bosnia, he suggests that Josip 
Stadler, archbishop of Vrhbosna seated at Sarajevo, should assume the of-
fice of bishop of Djakovo so that the “unity of the clergy in Bosnia” may be 
achieved. He argues that Croats need Bosnians because the latter are hardy, 
honest and reliable. From his perspective: “Anti-Serbism is here what anti-
Semitism is elsewhere. Self-defence!”21 
During the crisis caused by the Austro-Hungarian annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Josip Frank, the leader of the Pure Party of Right, 
advocates the reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy in the trialist mode, 
with Croatia enlarged with Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Greater Croatia, 
constituting its third entity.22 He hails the annexation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, believing that it forestalls the possibility of their being annexed 
by Serbia and paves the way for reshaping the Monarchy and for achieving 
his party objective, that of unification of Croatia and Dalmatia with Bos-
nia and Herzegovina.23 Frank begins to muster volunteers for the so-called 
Croatian People’s Legion [Hrvatska narodna legija], which would repel Ser-
bia’s regular and paramilitary units allegedly planning to make incursions 
into Bosnia and Herzegovina.24 Some of the Muslim members of Frank’s 
party show readiness to shed their blood for the cause of “unification of all 
Croatian lands”. At a conference held in Zagreb in November 1908, it could 
be heard that “thousands of Croatian Muslims [are ready] to rush to the 
Drina under the Croatian flag to defend the Croatian holies and the legacy 
of their ancestors”.25 At the same time, the Committee of the religious and 
cultural Croat People’s Union [Hrvatska narodna zajednica / HDZ] draws 
up a programme known as “Points”, explicitly stating that “Bosnia and Her-
zegovina are Croatian lands in ethnic and state right terms”, and that “the 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats naturally aspire to unite Bosnia and Herze-
20 Ibid. vol. I, 212.
21 Ibid. vol. II, 504, 568 and 587.
22 Marko Trogrlić, “Hrvatska i ‘Hrvatsko pitanje’ u korespondenciji Franka i Moritza 
von Auffenberg-Komárova (1908.–1910.)”, in Pravaška misao i politika (Zagreb: Hrvat-
ski institut za povijest, 2007), 168, 171–174. As early as 1890 Frank, in a speech he gave 
at the party club, advocated the unification of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, the 
“Croatian parts” Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Frank 
saw them united into a state within a federally organized, i.e. trialist monarchy.
23 Zlatko Hasanbegović, “Islam i muslimani u pravaškoj ideologiji: o pokušaju gradnje 
‘pravaške’ džamije u Zagrebu 1908”, in Pravaška misao i politika, 93.
24 On Frank’s mustering of volunteers to be used as a tool for Croatia to grab hold of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Kršnjavi, Zapisci, vol. II, 546–547 and 558.
25 Ibid.
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govina with Croatia, within the Habsburg Monarchy”.26 The Croat Catho-
lic Association [Hrvatska katolička udruga], founded in 1910, also adopts as 
one of its goals the article from the programme of the Party of Right relat-
ing to the unification of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia.27 The main 
promoter of Frank’s version of Rightism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, espe-
cially during the First World War, Josip Stadler, archbishop of Vrhbosna, 
advocates the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia.28
There have been all sorts of justifications — historical, natural, ethnic, 
geographic, economic, geopolitical etc. — for each object of Croatian ter-
ritorial hunger (such as, say, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vojvodina, parts of 
Slovenia, Montenegro), and a smoothly working mechanism developed in 
their support. Every pretension or claim by others on what they staked a 
claim themselves was fiercely criticized and condemned; a method which 
has been in use since the mid-nineteenth century is the demonization of the 
Serbs: the Serbs are described as a people of villains and brigands, byzan-
tinely cunning, primitive and devious; they are Šumadijan [central Serbian] 
bandits and chetniks. Croats, on the other hand, are a cultured, humane 
and peace-loving people; the territories they claim belong to them on vari-
ous grounds, whereas Serbs wish to seize them without any grounds, for 
the simple reason that they are marauders, a disruptive factor, a source of 
crises, unrests and wars.29 With amazing persistence, using proven methods, 
unchallenged or even aided by Belgrade’s short-sighted policies, they raised 
their Greater Croatian pretensions to the rank of a justified and legitimate 
right. Once this was accomplished, they did not even try to conceal the 
readiness to achieve their national and state demands at all costs, even by 
brutal force.30 The Serbs failed to work out an appropriate response to such 
26 Zlatko Matijević, “Politika i sudbina: dr. Ivo Pilar i njegova borba za samostojnost 
hrvatskog naroda”, in Pravaška misao i politika, 216.
27 Zoran Grijak, “Doprinos vrhbosanskog nadbiskupa dr. Josipa Stadlera djelovanju 
Stranke prava u Bosni i Hercegovini tijekom Prvoga svjetskog rata”, in Pravaška misao 
i politika, 181–182.
28 Ibid. 188 ff.
29 Cf. e.g. L. V. Südland, Južnoslavensko pitanje (Zagreb 1943), 383; Dr Ante Pavelić, 
Putem Hrvatskog Državnog prava (Buenos Aires — Madrid 1977), 486; Petar Vučić, 
Politička sudbina Hrvatske. Geopolitičke i geostrateške karakteristike Hrvatske (Zagreb 
1995), 156. 
30 As early as 1911, the Starčevićan youth emphasized, in article 7 of its Young 
Croat Programme (Riječ mlade Hrvatske, Hrvatskom djaštvu i svemu narodu posvećuje 
Starčevićanska mladost [Zagreb 1911], 4; italics mine): “Young Croats, as the staunch-
est champion of radical Greater Croatian propaganda, which will encompass all Croat 
lands mentioned in the political programme, as well as all Croat settlements, will mostly 
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a challenge. Enthusiastic about the Yugoslav idea, genuine and gullible pro-
ponents of brotherhood and unity, they were always a step behind.
The newspaper of the Croat community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Hrvatski dnevnik (Croat Journal), which held a purely racial stance on ter-
ritorial issues, brought a series of articles about the affiliation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The articles were assembled in a booklet titled Croatian Bos-
nia (Us and “them over there)” [Hrvatska Bosna (Mi i “oni tamo”)] published 
in Sarajevo in 1907. The opening pages of this toxically Frankist-clericalist 
[franko-furtimaši] reading state:
A whole series of features of Bosnia’s geographic, ethnographic and histori-
cal situation clearly mark its political position in relation to the monarchy, 
and the political symbolism of Croatdom in Bosnia even more clearly. It 
represents a link between the monarchy and Bosnia which may have given 
in the most difficult historical disasters but has never broken. It represents 
the ethnic link between the territory where the Croat tribe founded its true 
if still small state with present-day Croatia; it represents the link which 
entitles our king, in state-right terms, to feel a ruler and not a mandatary 
in Bosnia, briefly: only Croatdom, be it of the Christian or Islamic faith, is 
the element entitled to span the gap that there is between Europe and the 
Balkans.
This feeling is seething and living inside each of us, clearly setting us our 
task in the course of historical and cultural development: first and foremost 
to bring Bosnia closer to Croatia, to pave the way to the monarchy and into the 
heart of Europe, the way which, wherever to you may go from Bosnia, leads 
only via Croatia. In that way Croatdom will resurrect again, because the link of 
blood is the link stronger than steel! 
That we shall have to fight along the way is known to all: here we are, fight-
ing for a long time the eternal battle against the elements which gravitate to-
wards the other side of the fatal gap described above, which are being driven out 
of the union with the monarchy by some irresistible centrifugal force, which only 
yesterday met the authorities under the mask of loyalty, and today are weaving 
webs and throwing them across the Drina, which call us, Croats, their brothers 
so that they can, in the brotherly embrace, take away our historical rights and our 
nationality, and sell them — at Terazije [centre of Belgrade]!
But we are still on this side of the divide, and they over there will stay on 
the other! [pp. 5–6; italics mine]
This is the kind of feeling that Greater Croatian circles were imbued 
with. What relations were supposed to be like in the big country longed for 
and fantasized about for centuries can be seen from the newspaper Hrvat-
stvo [Croatdom]. The first issue, released in Zagreb on 2 May 1904, brings, 
rely on oral agitation and the press, as well as the founding of cultural institutions, with-
out refraining from other means in extreme cases”. 
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among other things, the following: “We shall fight for the independence of 
the Roman Catholic Church, for its rights and institutions, against every at-
tack, wherever it may come from. Our task will be [to ensure] that our entire 
public social life is revived and reborn in Jesus Christ […] We shall strive to 
ensure, through constitutional means, the organic extension of Croat state 
right […] In the Croat lands, we recognize only one political people: Croat, 
only one flag: Croat, only one official language: Croat.”
Fiercely attacking the Croats willing to team up with Serbs, Hrvatstvo 
wrote: 
Here, Christ, there, the Antichrist. Here, pure and glorious Croatdom 
under the Croat flag, there, a chaos of mindless principles and a muddle of 
various flags. Here, pride, inherited from the ancient Croats, who would 
not cede an inch of their land without bloodshed, and there, people who 
are giving Croat lands dewed with Croat blood away like old rags, all in 
the name of some ostensible concord, to those who would rather have 
their right hand cut off than hear of any concord with their brother. Some 
brotherhood indeed! 
The gap between Serbs and Croats will grow deeper because of us! That is 
what you are telling us too.
And who has ever spanned that gap? You? When and where? You’ve had 
plenty of time! So, where is that concord? The kind of concord some Serbs 
want to strike with you is the kind every ox can strike with its butcher. All 
it has to do is lay its head under his axe. We simply don’t need that kind of 
concord, because we’d cease being what we are and what we want to be — 
Croats […] as for their [Serb] political usurpations, we cannot get along 
with them until they acknowledge to the Croat lands that which belongs 
to them according to the compromise [of 1868]: one Croat flag, one Croat 
language, in a word, one political people, Croat.”
Even towards the very end of the First World War, when it was obvi-
ous that the Central Powers were defeated and the Habsburg Monarchy on 
the brink of disintegration, hopes that a Greater Croatia was possible were 
not given up, as evidenced by a note that Iso Kršnjavi wrote down on 25 
October 1918: “I’ve spoken with the government secretary Andres31 today, 
and he says there’s been word in government circles that an imperial mani-
festo recognizing a free greater Croatian state is going to be announced to-
morrow. This state will encompass Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia with Rijeka, 
and Medjimurje, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Perhaps Istria too. 
And the emperor will allegedly visit Zagreb a few days later.”32 
31 Ivan Andres (1883–1959), a politician, lawyer and legal writer.
32 Kršnjavi, Zapisci, vol. II, 806.
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Several prominent Croat politicians, besides those already mentioned, 
openly expressed the intention to have Bosnia and Herzegovina annexed to 
Croatia. For example, Stjepan Radić, having fled the country, had a writ-
ten proposal stating the “demands of Croats vis-a-vis Serbs” delivered to 
a Briton. The proposal envisaged “full independence of Croatia (Croatia, 
Slavonia and Dalmatia) in a confederation with Serbia on the basis of the 
Entente through an accord which would leave up to Slovenia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bačka, Banat, Montenegro and Macedonia to decide freely 
by plebiscite if they wish to remain tied to militarist and centralist Serbia or 
enter a federation with peaceful and neutral Croatia”.33 At about the same 
time (on 23 September 1923) Radić, still in London, asks of the Presi-
dency of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (Hrvatska republikanska 
seljačka stranka / HRSS) to have the Map: Croatia and Croats drawn up. Be-
sides Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Medjumurje, Prekomurje “with Krka and 
Kastav”, the map was supposed to contain all former Austro-Hungarian 
lands: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bačka, Banat and Baranja, and even Mon-
tenegro and Macedonia. In his instructions for drawing up this map, which 
was obviously intended mostly for foreigners because it was to have annota-
tions in French or English, Radić stresses: “In the area from Subotica to the 
Adriatic Sea, all districts where Croats account for more than 50% of the 
population are to be marked in (in Bosnia, Muslim and Catholic Croats are, 
naturally, counted together) blue shades, and the Orthodox in red.”34
By turning to the British and having the Map drawn, Radić obviously 
wanted to internationalize the Croat question. His written proposal depicts 
Serbia in dark colours as a militarist and centralist country which lacks 
democratic liberties and rights, a country with which a country as freedom- 
and peace-loving as Croatia cannot live in a state union. Presenting Serbia 
as inept and incapable of keeping all the listed provinces together, he recom-
mends Croatia as the focal point around which these provinces — Slovenia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bačka, Banat, Montenegro and Macedonia — 
could gather on a federal basis. This appears to have been an overt attempt 
to break up the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and instead to lay 
down the foundations of the long-yearned-for Greater Croatia of which 
the Greater-Croatian ideologist Eugen Kvaternik had dreamt and written, 
the one “not from the Drava to the sea but from the Salzburg-Tyrol Alps to 
Kosovo and Albania”. That the latter conclusion is not far-fetched may be 
seen from a report of the British minister in Belgrade and his remark that 
there is in the mind of the “pan-Croat” a vision of a “powerful province” 
33 Djordje Dj. Stanković, Pašić i Hrvati, 1918–1923 (Belgrade 1995), 310.
34 The original letter was in the possession of the late Dr Aleksandar Vlaškalić, through 
whose courtesy it was made available to me.
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centred on Zagreb, which would consist of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, a 
good part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Baranja, and a part of Bačka.35 While 
making drafts of a new party programme (1925), Radić also intended to 
change the boundaries of Bosnia in such a way that the Bosnian Sava Valley 
(Posavina) was annexed to Croatia. According to this project, the Gulf of 
Kotor (Boka Kotorska) would be detached from Croatia, but Croatia would 
be given parts of Herzegovina in return.36 
After the end of the war in 1918, Ante Pavelić also frequently re-
verts to the question of Croatia’s territorial extent. The programme of the 
Party of Right of 1 March 1919, behind which stood Pavelić, stresses that 
the party will use “all legal means to ensure that all Croat lands (Croatia, 
Slavonia, Dalmatia, Rijeka with the kotar, Medjumurje, Prekomurje, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Istria with the islands) are united, on the basis of 
Croatian state right and the right to national self-determination, into one 
independent Croatian state.”37 In the Pro-memoria he submitted in 1927 
to Roberto Forges Davanzati, a member of the Grand Council of Fascism, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina are incorporated into Croatia. The Pro-memoria 
on Consultations Held in Budapest on 31 October 1927 states that the 
“Croatian state encompasses Croatia with Medjumurje, Slavonia with 
Syrmia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Dalmatia”. The draft pro-memoria 
of September 1928, which was supposed to be signed by representatives “of 
the Royal Italian government and the Croat people”, and which called for 
constituting a Croat state, states that the latter will be composed of “Croa-
tia and Slavonia, Medjumurje, Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina”. In 
article 2, the Italian government is called upon to acknowledge Croatia and 
Slavonia with Medjumurje, Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as be-
ing “historically Croat lands, and to support and help in every way the aspi-
ration of the Croat people for the creation of an independent state”. Pavelić 
sees Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of Croatia in some of his published 
writings as well, such as Die kroatischen Länder und ihre Bevölkerung (1931), 
or Die kroatische Frage (1936). In the former case, this Croatia of his had an 
area of 107,753 km2, and in the latter about 107,000 km2.38 
35 Živko Avramovski, Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji: godišnji izveštaji Britanskog pos-
lanstva u Beogradu 1921–1938, vol. I: 1921–1930 (Belgrade — Zagreb 1986), 44; Sofija 
Božić, Srbi u Hrvatskoj 1918–1929 (Belgrade 2008), 45.
36 “Zabilješka Marije Radić”, Zagreb, 23 March 1925, Bogdan Krizman, Korespondencija 
Stjepana Radića 1919–1929 (Zagreb 1973), vol. II, 604–605.
37 Mario Jareb, Ustaško-domobranski pokret od nastanka do travnja 1941. godine (Zagreb 
2006), 165.
38 Ibid. 169.
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In discussing the territorial extent of the Croatian state, Pavelić and 
his Ustasha followers invariably emphasize the Croat state and historical 
right to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatia they envisage always stretch-
es east to the Drina. Characteristic in that respect is Pavelić’s article “Bosnia 
is ours” published in 1932. Among other things, it says the following: “as far 
as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, let Belgrade know […] that these 
are ancient Croat lands […] and that the Croat people will never let our 
lands be severed from the motherland, Croatia, that we shall all die rather 
than let the greater-Serbian moloch swallow them. Let Belgrade not forget 
that ancient Duvno Field [Duvanjsko polje] is in Bosnia, let it not forget 
that there is in Bosnia and Herzegovina a Croat Catholic-Muslim majority 
[…] and let Belgrade know that the whole of Croatdom will fight to the last drop 
of blood for these lands of theirs, that they will surely cut off those covetous Bel-
grade hands that are reaching out for this Croatian jewel… Bosnia is Croatian 
and we will never give it up.”39 In the pro-Ustasha press and books legally 
published in the late 1930s and early 1940s Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
openly referred to as a Croatian territory.40 The map on the front page of 
the monthly Ustaša for July 1930 shows Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of 
a Greater Croatia. A comparable example can be found in Pavelić’s book 
published two years later,41 which contains a map titled La Croatie et les Pays 
danubiens. Bosnia and Herzegovina are also shown as part of Croatia in a 
map on the front page of Hrvatski domobran (Croat Home Defender) for 
1933, and on a postage stamp issued by the Main Ustasha Headquarters in 
Italy in 1934. The whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina is featured as part of 
Croatia in the map titled “Croats in Historic Croatia (according to the 1931 
population census)” in Mladen Lorković’s book Narod i zemlja Hrvata (The 
Croat People and Land), published in Zagreb in 1939. Especially relevant 
to understanding the scale of Greater-Croatian ambitions is a leaflet, il-
legally printed in 1940, which contains a map of all areas which were sup-
posed to be incorporated into the Independent State of Croatia: in addition 
to Croatia and Dalmatia, these were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Sandžak, Slovenia, Syrmia, Baranja and Bačka.42 
Vladko Maček, the successor of Stjepan Radić, continued to pursue 
his predecessor’s Greater-Croatian policy. Even before Radić’s death (1928), 
in a speech he gave in 1923, he states that the “Croatian idea has spread […] 
from the Mura to Montenegro, from the Adriatic Sea to Zemun”, and that 
39 Ibid. 169 (italics mine).
40 Ibid. 179.
41 Ante Pavelić, La restauration économique des pays danubiens. Le désarmement. Belgrade 
et Croatie (Geneva: Edition de la correspondance croate Grič, 1932).
42 Jareb, Ustaško-domobranski pokret, 168–183.
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now Bosnia too “has joined Croatian Dalmatia, which has for centuries 
wished to get in with her sister, Croatia”.43 His goal is a state composed 
of all former Austro-Hungarian South-Slavic provinces under Croatian 
leadership and, possibly, tied to Serbia in the form of an “association of 
interests”. Like Radić, he also advocates some form of plebiscite, motivated 
by the wish to divide the Kingdom of Yugoslavia into two parts, with the 
Drina as the boundary between them. According to a statement he made 
in 1936, each province: “Vojvodina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Macedonia, even Dalmatia, may choose as they wish, i.e. as their represen-
tatives, elected in an election for a constituent assembly, should decide. In 
other words: if Vojvodina wants [to come together] with Serbia — fine, if 
it wants [to be] out of it, fine, if it wants with Croatia, together or separately, 
it’s fine again…”
A testimony to Maček’s growing territorial appetites has been left by 
Jovan Jovanović Pižon, leader of the Agrarian Party, who wrote down what 
Prince Paul Karadjordjević had told him. At a meeting between the Prince 
and Maček held before the Cvetković-Maček Agreement (1939), the Prince 
asked, “What do you think Croatia is?”, and Maček replied, “The banovinas 
of Primorje [Coast] and Sava.” At another meeting, Maček claimed Du-
brovnik, and then Vrbas Banovina (with a ninety-percent Serb population). 
At a third meeting, Maček laid claim to Syrmia as far as Ilok, Brčko with its 
environs, Bijeljina, Travnik, Fojnica, and Herzegovina.44 
Even after the Cvetković-Maček Agreement of August 1939 created 
Banovina Croatia, ceding to it parts of western Bosnia (previously within 
Vrbas Banovina), Maček was not satisfied with the territorial extent of the 
new Banovina. He thought of the agreement as being “incomplete” and 
containing a number of debatable issues, notably territorial. Since, as he put 
it, the agreement “has not definitively settled the Croatian territorial ques-
tion”, a provision was included that the definitive extent of Banovina Croa-
tia will be determined at the reorganization of the state union. “And this is 
only natural,” Maček stressed, “because the territory of Banovina Croatia 
will look completely different depending on whether the reorganized state 
union includes, say, an autonomous Vojvodina or not, an autonomous Bos-
nia or not, etc.”45
43 Božidar Murgić, Dr Vladko Maček — vodja Hrvata (Zagreb n.d.), 34. Given this 
viewpoint of Maček, S. Božić, Srbi u Hrvatskoj, 49, rightly concludes that his idea of the 
borders of Greater Croatia was not in any way different from the borders proposed at 
the First Croatian Catholic Congress held in Zagreb in 1900. 
44 Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia], J. Jovanović Papers, Notes of Jovan 
Jovanović Pižon, Note of 26 March 1939.
45 Ranko Končar,Opozicione partije i autonomija Vojvodine 1929–1941 (Novi Sad 1995), 339.
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The aspiration to expand Croatia to the greatest extent possible con-
tinued at the time of the Independent State of Croatia [Nezavisna Država 
Hrvatska/NDH] as well. Dissatisfied with its size, the Ustasha establish-
ment sought to enlarge it through the mediation of Slavko Kvaternik, 
Pavelić’s deputy. In a telegram of 14 May 1941, the German minister in Za-
greb Siegfried Kasche conveyed to his Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kvater-
nik’s request to expand “Croat” territories to the Albanian border, including 
the towns of Priboj, Prijepolje and Pljevlja. Kasche supported the request, 
arguing that “Croat troops have already been stationed there”. However, 
Italy objected. Count Ciano described the request as “Croat imperialism”, 
and in the diary entry of 30 June 1941, wrote: “Now Pavelić would like to 
have the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. An absurd, groundless demand. I’ve prepared 
a letter of rejection signed by the Duce.”46
According to a book on the activity of the German Intelligence Ser-
vice (Bundesnachrichtendienst/BND), one of the key figures in the Yugoslav 
communist establishment, Ivan Stevo Krajačić, drew up, and at the time 
Josip Broz’s unlimited power was in full swing, a plan for creating “sovereign 
Croatia with Bosnia and Herzegovina” with borders matching those of the 
Independent State of Croatia in 1941.47 This may be seen as yet another 
proof of consistency in Greater-Croatian aspirations, especially those relat-
ing to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Political systems, state frames, forms of 
government and political leaders have been changing, but not the policy 
intent on drawing Croatia’s border along the Drina.
The geopolitical position of Croatia is involved in many issues that 
burdened, and continue to burden, Croato-Serbian relations. According to 
the generally held opinion of leading Croat politicians and geopoliticians, 
past and present, Croatia resembles a banana, a crescent or, as the well-
known Croat historian Vjakoslav Klaić described it, a “sausage [its ends] 
well straddled apart”. In early 1909, hopeful to change it, Klaić develops 
a political programme according to which “Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegov-
ina, Istria and the islands should unite”, forming an entity in which Cro-
ats would constitute a majority, and they should join Austria.48 A banana-
shaped Croatia, in the view of practically all politically thinking Croats, has 
no chance of survival and progress. Antun Radić explains that “Dalmatia 
united with Croatia would look like crusts of a bread loaf, and the inside 
you’d scoop out would be Bosnia and Herzegovina hollowed out of the 
46 Smilja Avramov, Genocid u Jugoslaviji u svetlosti medjunarodnog prava (Belgrade 1992), 
265.
47 Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, Der Schattenkrieger (Dusseldorf 1955), 213; Smilja Avra-
mov, Postherojski rat zapada protiv Jugoslavije (Novi Sad 1997), 193–194.
48 Kršnjavi, Zapisci, vol. II, 561.
Balcanica XLV (2014)282
Croatian bread […] and if we want to be fully fed, we need the inside, we 
need Herzeg-Bosnia”.49 For Antun’s brother, Stjepan Radić, Bosnia is “like 
the bowels of the rest of Croatia. Well, take out a man’s bowels and tell him 
to live”. In the view of Frano Supilo: “Croatia without Bosnia will always 
be a toy in the hands of whoever rules the presently-occupied provinces 
[Bosnia and Herzegovina]”.50 Croat politicians believed that for economic 
and financial independence to become permanent takes achieving new ter-
ritories. Hrvatski dnevnik wrote in 1940: “Croatia in its present-day extent 
cannot last in permanence, for it needs some more parts for its own eco-
nomic development.”51
According to the most prominent and most highly esteemed Cro-
at geopolitician of the interwar period, Ivo Pilar (who also wrote under 
pseudonyms L. v. Südland, Dr. Jurčić and Florian Lichtträger), “from the 
geopolitical perspective, the triune [kingdom] has no chance of surviv-
ing in national-political and economic-political terms without Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.”52 Pilar’s view expressed in the book The South-Slav Question, 
which saw four editions within a few decades, two in German and two in 
Croatian, was that “Croatia and Slavonia separated from Bosnia and Dal-
matia, their natural constituent parts, are a torso unable to survive”.53 In a 
booklet which considers the course the Croat people should take even be-
fore the end of the Great War, published in 1915 and republished in 1917, 
Pilar let it be known in no vague terms what the strategic goal of the Croats 
is and has to be: “The Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia with its 
long and narrow territory of very small depth, which stretches in two direc-
tions (Dalmatia, at places, only a few kilometres [deep]), are not at all able 
on their own to be the scene of any state and political creation and, in this 
form, have no future whatsoever as a national-political body. This realization 
was, in our view, the cause of that frantic quest for a broader framework for 
our national development before the year 1878; it was the cause behind the 
emergence of Illyrianism and Yugoslavism. The Triune Kingdom will have 
the basic requisites for existence only with Bosnia and Herzegovina joined 
to it. The Croat people in the Triune Kingdom itself has little prospect of 
49 Dom no. 7, 4 April 1901.
50 Frano Supilo, Politički spisi: članci, govori, pisma, memorandumi, ed. D. Sević (Zagreb: 
Znanje, 1970), 179.
51 Hrvatski dnevnik no. 1346, 30 January 1940.
52 Dr. Ivo Pilar, Politički zemljopis hrvatskih zemalja: geopolitička studija (Sarajevo 1918), 
21.
53 L. v. Südland, Die südslavische Frage und der Weltkrieg. Übersichtliche Darstellung des 
Gesamt-Problems (Vienna 1918), quoted after the translated edition: Južnoslavensko pi-
tanje: prikaz cjelokupnog pitanja (Zagreb 1943), 391.
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survival, and Bosnia and Herzegovina emerge as an essential requisite for 
the national survival and political development of the Croat people. Lim-
ited to the Triune Kingdom alone, the Croat people can only survive; it 
will be able to live only if it has Bosnia and Herzegovina.”54 In Pilar’s view, 
Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia are the shell, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the core of Croatia.55 
A statement Pilar made in a conversation with Iso Kršnjavi, occa-
sioned on 1 June 1918 by Pilar’s intention to found, with the archbishop 
Stadler, a new Croatian party in parallel with the Pure Party of Right, may 
provide some insight into him as a person and politician, and into his views 
of Serbs: “Serbs ought not rule, they should be treated as a subordinate 
nationality.”56
In line with the shell-and-core view illustrated above, the fourth 
volume of the Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia published in 1960 by the Za-
greb-based Lexicographical Institute of the Federal People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia, under the direction of Miroslav Krleža, contained the entry on 
Croatia which was accompanied by a map of this republic with the whole 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all the way to the Drina, joined to it. The map 
accompanying the text on Serbia in the seventh volume of the Encyclopae-
dia released in 1968 followed a different approach. Serbia was halted at the 
Drina, barely allowed to cross to the left bank of the river. In this, as in many 
other cases, Croatian geopolitical mania for Bosnia and Herzegovina came 
to the surface.
What the Lexicographical Institute did in the 1960s was neither new 
nor unusual when it comes to Croatian territorial pretensions towards Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. The tradition is more than a century old. As early as 
1862, Josip Partaš prepared a geographic map according to a draft made by 
Franjo Kužić, titled “Historic map of the whole of the Kingdom of Croatia 
with boundaries of the now existing provinces and major ancient and more re-
cent places”.57 The map shows Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, south-
western parts of Serbia and south-eastern parts of Slovenia as lands of the 
Kingdom of Croatia.
At this point, it should be remembered that the First Croatian Cath-
olic Congress held in Zagreb in 1900 produced a map showing the eastern 
54 Dr. Juričić, Svjetski rat i Hrvati. Pokus orijentacije hrvatskoga naroda još prije svršetka 
rata (Zagreb 1915; and 1917), 65.
55 Pilar, Politički zemljopis, 26.
56 Kršnjavi, Zapisci, 796.
57 Historički zemljovid cijelokupne Kraljevine Hervatske sa označenjem granicah sada 
obstojećih pokrajinah i navedenjem znamenitijih starijih i novijih mijestah, printed in Za-
greb by the well-known printing house of Dragutin Albrecht.
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border of Greater Croatia stretching from Kotor on the Adriatic coast to 
Zemun at the confluence of the Danube and Sava rivers: Croat historians 
“rolled up their sleeves” and got down to proving that the entire area “has 
been a Croat ethnic space in history”.58
As much in keeping with the Greater Croatian aspiration to have 
Croatia’s eastern border on the Drina is an ethnographic map prepared by 
Nikola Zvonimir Bjelovučić in 1933, and published in his little book The 
Ethnographic Boundaries of Croats and Slovenes released in Dubrovnik in 
1934. With its by no means small territorial enlargement, this map, titled 
“Ethnographic boundaries of Croats in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and ad-
jacent countries”, irresistibly resembles the Independent State of Croatia 
under Ante Pavelić. This Croatia incorporates all of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, the Gulf of Kotor and the Adriatic coast further south to Bar, western 
parts of Bačka, the Baja area in Hungary, parts of Hungary southeast of 
Pecs, a long tract of land along the left bank of the Drava from Sveti Martin 
in the east to Donja Lendava in the west, and all of Syrmia. Deliberately a 
broad-brush and imprecise depiction, Bjelovučić’s map was an expression 
of Greater Croatian territorial pretensions rather than a faithful reflection 
of the actual ethnic proportions. It encompassed all lands which were seen 
as belonging to Croatia by state and historical right. Ethnography was a 
pretext for making a public statement of Greater Croatian political goals in 
a blurred way.
With this summary overview of the subject which could otherwise 
be extensively discussed, even readers unfamiliar with the Greater Croatian 
ambitions harboured by earlier generations will not find it difficult to iden-
tify the sources and inspiration of the modern-day Croat politicians who 
believe that Croatia should be defended on the Drina (such as, for example, 
the late Dalibor Brozović, member of the Croatian Academy of Sciences, or 
Franjo Tudjman). They invoke Croatian state and historical right to claim, 
say, the Gulf of Kotor or Bačka, while at the same time wishing to preserve 
the internal boundaries between the federal units of the former Yugoslavia, 
popularly known as “AVNOJ boundaries”.
The answer to the central issue in relations between Croats and Serbs, 
as well as the causes of their occasional conflicts and, eventually, a war reside 
in the programme of the ideological predecessors of Pavelić’s Ustasha — the 
former Party of Right and the Frankists-clericalists — which championed 
a single flag, Croat, and a single political people, Croat, in one large Croat 
state.
Croatian politics was steeped in the ideas of Ivo Pilar, constituting 
the basis for its geostrategic goals and the national idea. Pilar’s geopolitical 
58 Milorad Ekmečić, Srbija izmedju srednje Evrope i Evrope (Belgrade 1992), 98.
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views and Greater Croatian aspirations found a consistent follower in the 
historical work of Dominik Mandić, whose attention was also focused on 
Bosnia seen as a Croatian land: “With its mountainous ranges, river routes 
and its entire geopolitical strength, B[osnia] and H[erzegovina] continue, 
fill up and territorially connect the northern, Pannonian, Croat lands with 
the southern, Adriatic, lands. Without B and H, Croat lands would be left 
torn apart, lacking natural communications and territorial wholeness. The 
river Drina with its deep bed and the surrounding high mountains closes 
up the Croat lands and separates them from the Serb lands and the central 
Balkans. It is the line along which the Romans divided the eastern and 
western Roman Empire; it is there that the eastern and western churches, 
western and eastern cultures are divided.59
That Franjo Tudjman harboured Greater Croatian pretensions much 
before he became the president of Croatia can be seen from his 1977 “Draft 
of the Programme of the Croat National and Socialist Movement [Hrvatski 
narodni i socijalistički pokret / HNSP]”, published much later in his book 
Usudbene povjestice (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 1995): “It is true 
that the leadership of the HNSP starts from the reality of present-day 
boundaries of the republics, but it has to keep in mind that they were estab-
lished to the detriment of Croatia in every respect […] Syrmia and the Gulf 
of Kotor were exempted from the historic borders of the Croatian (Triune) 
Kingdom and taken away from Croatia, while the purely Croat areas in 
B[osnia]-H[erzegovina] (which had been incorporated even into Banovina 
Croatia in 1939) were not joined to it, nor was the Croat part of Bačka 
(with Subotica). Besides, while Vojvodina was joined to Serbia even though 
the national programme of the C[ommunist] P[arty of ] Y[ugoslavia] in the 
former [interwar] Yugoslavia demanded that it become a federal unit, B-H 
was not incorporated into the Croat federal unit, although it is connected 
with Croatia in every respect (geographically, economically, by transporta-
tion, historically and culturally) more than Vojvodina is with Serbia.”60 
When the Croat Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajedni-
ca/HDZ) led by Tudjman began its struggle for political power in Croatia, 
the promotional campaign it offered contained all geostrategic, economic 
and national-political ideas about Bosnia and Herzegovina which Ivo Pilar 
and Dominik Mandić had left as a legacy. Insisting on Bosnia and Her-
zegovina’s inseparableness from Croatia, the HDZ programme advocated 
59 Dr Dominik Mandić, Hrvatske zemlje u prošlosti i sadašnjosti (Chicago–Rome 1973), 
167–168.
60 Ivo Goldštajn, “Hrvatska i rat u Bosni 1992–1995: jedan pogled iz Zagreba”, in Ne 
damo te lijepa naša, collection of papers from the conference “Hrvati u BiH danas”, 
Banjaluka, 4–6 March 2011 (Banjaluka 2011), 109–110. 
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an “economic, transportational, spiritual and civilizational association of 
the Socialist Republic of Croatia and the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina which constitute a natural, indivisible geopolitical whole and 
whose historical destiny suggests their reliance on one another”.61 Based on 
such premises, the Croat emigration in Canada, led by Gojko Šušak and in 
close contact with the HDZ leadership, by mid-1989 had already had a map 
of Greater Croatia encompassing all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vojvodina, 
Sandžak and the Montenegrin Adriatic coast. At a Croat emigrant meeting 
held that year in Vancouver, “[these] maps of ‘greater Croatia’ hung all over 
the place”.62
When it comes to the HDZ’s Greater Croatian pretensions, par-
ticularly significant is the “Proclamation to the citizens and Diet of Croa-
tia and to all Croat people” created in Zagreb on 29 November 1989. 
Article 2 of the “Proclamation” (which was signed, among others, by Šime 
Balen, Franjo Tudjman, Dalibor Brozović, Vladimir Šeks, Josip Manolić 
and Branimir Glavaš) states: “In opposition to the publicly communicated 
plans for creating a Greater Serbia, within or without the SFR Yugoslavia, 
and at the expense of the Croat and other non-Serb peoples, we put forth 
the demand for the territorial wholeness of the Croat people within its 
historical and natural borders.” The “Proclamation” was meant to mobilize 
Croatia against “Greater Serbian aggression”. There was no unanimity as 
to the precise delineation of Croatia’s “historical and natural borders”, but 
all agreed that they should encompass Bosnia and Herzegovina, and con-
siderable portions of Vojvodina. After much debate and several versions of 
the borders, Manolić’s proposal was adopted not to go into delineating the 
borders, but instead to simply state that “there are historical and natural 
borders of Croatia”: “Why go into discussing whether to take this corner 
away from someone or to leave some other! We have stayed on the idea 
of unspecified borders anyway. Neither the borders of Banovina Croatia, 
nor the borders of the NDH, nor the AVNOJ borders! But simply — 
borders.”63
As may be seen from Tudjman’s talks with representatives of the 
Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina and with his closest associates from 
Croatia during the Yugoslav crisis and wars (1991–1999), he sought ways to 
tie some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as closely as possible to Croatia 
in state and legal terms. At the meeting with a HDZ-BH delegation held 
in Zagreb on 27 December 1991, Tudjman said, inter alia: “So, it seems 
61 Dušan Vilić and Boško Todorovic, Razbijanje Jugoslavije 1990–1992 (Belgrade 1995), 
416.
62 Darko Hudelist, Tudjman: biografija (Zagreb 2004), 638.
63 Ibid. 656–659 ff.
V. Dj. Krestić, Croatian Pretensions to Bosnia and Herzegovina 287
to me, just like we exploited this historical moment to create an indepen-
dent, internationally recognized Croatia, so I believe it is the moment to 
unite the Croat national being within the maximum possible borders. If 
that would be exactly 30 municipalities or 28 is less important even from 
this perspective…” Like Pilar, in fact following in Pilar’s footsteps, Tudjman 
argued that “the state of Croatia as it is [likened to an unnatural pretzel] 
has no requisites for life, but a Croatian state even within the Banovina 
borders [1939] has…”64 Intent on grabbing hold of some parts of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina,65 Tudjman was ready to settle on the slightly expanded 
1939 borders of Banovina Croatia,66 or to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina 
with Serbia.67
Following in the ideological footsteps of the Rightists, Frankists-
clericalists and Ustashas, Tudjman, the good student of Ivo Pilar and Do-
minik Mandić, was adamantly opposed to the Muslims’ self-identification 
as Bosniaks, insisting instead upon their being defined as Croats of Muslim 
faith, with a prospect of gradual Croatization,68 just as the Serbs in Croatia 
were constantly pressed into becoming Croats of Orthodox faith. He justi-
fied the pretensions towards Bosnia and Herzegovina by the claim that 
constituting it as a republic after the Second World War had been a “his-
torical absurdity”, the restoration of “a colonial creation formed between the 
fifteenth and the eighteenth century”.69
Tudjman’s commitment to Pilar’s ideas can also be seen from a state-
ment he made on 17 September 1992 at a meeting with representatives of 
the Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina: “Gentlemen, the Bosnia-Herze-
govina question is one of the vital questions for the Croat people as a whole, 
for the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign, internationally recognized state, 
and all Croats in B-H should be aware of it. It is not just a problem of the 
Croats in B-H, it is a problem of the Croatian state, of the Croat people as a 
whole. Why? Because it is so connected both historically and geopolitically 
with Croatia because of the unnatural borders of the present-day state of 
Croatia, because of B-H, be it this way or that…”70 
64 Goldštajn, “Hrvatska i rat u Bosni”, 111.
65 Stenogrami o podjeli Bosne, vol. I, ed. Predrag Lucić (Split – Sarajevo: Kultura & Ras-
vjeta, 2005), 87–88.
66 Ibid. 118.
67 Ibid. 245.
68 For more on this, see vol. II of Stenogrami o podjeli Bosne, ed. Ivan Lovrenović, 131, 
145, 196, 217, 352 ff, 398 ff, 491 ff. 
69 Goldštajn, “Hrvatska i rat u Bosni”, 111.
70 Stenogrami o podjeli Bosne, vol. I, 237.
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Tudjman was ready to go to war to achieve his goal as regards Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. In a conversation with representatives of the Croat 
Defence Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane/HVO) for the Sava Valley region 
(Posavina) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the municipalities of Ravno, 
Čapljina and Stolac, on 21 September 1993, he said, among other things: 
“A horrible thing such as war, that which is a tragedy for a person, for a family, 
for some areas, the greatest tragedy that there can be, in a sense even produces, by 
way of demarcation between peoples, some more favourable circumstances for the 
survival of some peoples in the future…”.71 Just as he justified genocide in his 
book Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti,72 so now he justified war and bloodshed in 
the name of a better future for Croatia and Croats.
Even as the war was drawing to an end, at a meeting of Croatia’s 
highest officials in late 1993, Tudjman argued these were the times when 
“borders of the future Croatian state are being defined. They will probably 
be larger than any Croat ruler or king in history had ever had under his 
control. […] The Croat Republic of Herceg Bosna will join Croatia. Croatia 
will be stronger and more powerful.”73 This is an interesting statement for 
more than one reason, but there does not seem to be any doubt that the 
obsession of the Croatian president and his team — because of which he 
went to war to break Yugoslavia and create an independent Croatia — was 
a Greater Croatia. While carefully concealing the ultimate goal, the Croa-
tian political leadership headed by Tudjman was using the well-known red-
herring tactic ruthlessly accusing Serbia of having started the war in order 
to create a Greater Serbia. 
The author of a book on Croatia’s political destiny argues without 
any hesitation that, after the capitulation of Italy in September 1943, and 
the annulment of the Treaty of Rome,74 the Independent State of Croatia 
(Nezavisna Država Hrvatska / NDH) was territorially rounded out, that 
Croatia achieved its geopolitical and geostrategic ideal in terms of size, 
shape and position. The only problem was that this ideal Croatia had “too 
much non-Croat population”.75 About the Ustasha state rounded out in 
September 1943, the same author, Petar Vučić, has to say the following: 
“Even though it largely remained an unattained ideal, it has nonetheless re-
71 Ibid. 337 (italics mine).  
72 Published by Matica hrvatska in Zagreb in 1989; revised English edition: Horrors of 
War (New York: M. Evans & Company, 1996).
73 Goldštajn, “Hrvatska i rat u Bosni”, 111.
74 The Treaty of Rome concluded on 27 January 1924 between the Kingdom of SCS 
and Italy recognized Italian sovereignty over the city of Rijeka (Fiume).
75 Petar Vučić, Politička sudbina Hrvatske: geopolitičke i geostrateške karakteristike Hrvatske 
(Zagreb: Mladost, 1995), 221.
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mained a lasting witness to a high state-building movement which, through 
such a state-building project (albeit incompletely accomplished), became a 
true successor of the Croat historical state-building ideal and thought.”76 
The line of thinking which is quite in keeping with the well-known state-
ment of Franjo Tudjman that “the NDH was not merely a ‘quisling’ creation 
and a ‘fascist crime’ but also an expression of the Croat people’s historical 
aspirations for its own independent state as well as of the realization by in-
ternational factors […] of these aspirations of Croatia and of its geographi-
cal borders.”77 The ill-informed may have been surprised and upset by this 
statement, but it was fully in line with a century of aspirations and trends 
of Croatian politics.
In Tudjman’s case, these aspirations and trends are visible from his 
public statements as well. So, for example, in the opening speech he gave at 
the First General HDZ Convention held in Zagreb on 24 and 25 February 
1990, he said the following: “This demand of ours has been an expression 
and continuation of the viewpoint of only such Croatian politicians of the 
last and this century as the ‘father of the homeland’ Dr. Ante Starčević, 
then Mihovil Pavlinović, Dr. Ante Trumbić and Stjepan Radić. All of them 
spoke of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the viewpoint of their geopolitical 
unity with Croatia and the West, having no doubts as to where their people 
would decide it belonged at a referendum.”78 Judging by this, Tudjman was a 
true follower of the geopolitician Pilar, the historian Mandić and poglavnik 
Pavelić, as can also be seen from what he said at his meeting with the high-
est military officials held on 23 August 1995 in the Presidential Palace in 
Zagreb. Tudjman clearly and without a second thought let his collocutors 
know that the demographic issue in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Istria 
should be resolved militarily because, he emphasized, it was the only way to 
firm up Croatdom in those parts, adding that the Croat Republic of Herceg 
Bosna and the HVO had been created specifically for that purpose.79 
That a Greater Croatia with all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as far as 
the Drina, has been an ideal of Croat politicians can also be seen from the 
words of a priest uttered from the pulpit of the church of the Wounded 
Jesus in Zagreb. He wished for a “more beautiful, better, larger and happier” 
Croatia whose seat would be at Banjaluka, as the poglavnik had wished it to 
be. The Dominican Vjekoslav Lasić also expressed his hope that the wish 
76 Ibid.
77 “Prvi opći sabor Hrvatske demokratske zajednice”, Glasnik HDZ-a 8 (March 1990), 
18.
78 Za Hrvatsku (Zagreb: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia), 234–235.
79 Ivica Djikić, “Stenogrami o etničkom čišćenju: Feral objavljuje sadržaj tajnog sastanka 
Tudjmanova štaba nakon ‘Oluje’”, Feral Tribune, 5 July 2003.
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would come true, even more so because the “current shape of Croatia is a 
little bit strange”.80
Vjekoslav Matijević, a lawyer and President of the Croatian Liber-
ation Movement (Hrvatski oslobodilački pokret) — founded by Pavelić in 
1929 after the Croatian Party of Right was banned — said in an interview 
in 1993 that the Croats had to be “firm and adamant about the question of 
our borders, and join forces to stop the Serbs from crossing the Drina…”81
Vučić, the Dominican Lasić and Matijević are not lonely fanatics. 
They say what and how Croat political circles thought and still think about 
the future of Croatia. A certain Radomir Milišić joined them when he 
wrote: “Since the destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the destiny of the 
Croats in this state, is inseparable from Croatia, i.e. Croatia and Croats have 
to do their best to let it separate from Croatia too much (because Croats are 
a sovereign people there, and they can defend that right only with the help 
of the Republic of Croatia), Croatia will have to keep and eye and ear on 
that space which is so vital to it. The spaces that the Croats in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina have organized and physically defended are a basis of Croat 
sovereignty in that state, as well as proof that Bosnia cannot be built with-
out Croats.”82 
Finally, the very fact that an institute named after Dr Ivo Pilar was 
founded in Zagreb not so long ago appears to show that his thought is still 
well and alive in Croatia, and that it has a following.
As a result of the persistent demand for incorporating Bosnia and 
Herzegovina into Croatia, so that the latter can live and not just “vegetate”, 
the Croats, as Stjepan Radić believed, “have been taught to think that there 
can be no free and united Croatia without Bosnia and Herzegovina”.83
The few examples of Greater-Croatian territorial pretensions towards 
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the grounds of Croat state and historical right 
presented here serve only as an illustration. However, all followers of the 
policy of Eugen Kvaternik and Ante Starčević, who predicated their pro-
grammes on “on old deeds and ‘virtual’ territorial claims”, had a rapacious 
appetite for territory. There is no need today to waste time proving that the 
Ustasha regime of Ante Pavelić based its entire politics on Croat state and 
historical right. That politics showed its dark face to the world during the 
war years from 1941 to 1945. Even though the world was surprised and ap-
palled by its vicious brutality, it was a logical outcome of an ill-founded and 
80 Damir Pilić, “Kako je otac Vjekoslav Lasić u crkvi Ranjenog Isusa u Zagrebu obo-
gotvorio ustaškoga Antu Pavelića”, Feral Tribune, 6 January 1997.
81 Hrvatski vjesnik no. 21–22 (Vinkovci, Zadar), 15 May 1993, 14–15.
82 Radomir Milišić, Stvaranje Hrvatske: analiza nacionalne strategije (Zagreb 1995), 12.
83 Stjepan Radić, Politički spisi (Zagreb: Znanje, 1971), 289.
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irrational policy which could have no other result than hatred towards the 
Serbs, eventually leading to one of the most horrible genocides in history.
Franjo Tudjman also based his politics on Croat state and historical 
right and planned to incorporate Bosnia and Herzegovina into Croatia, 
because he was also “taught to think”, as Radić put it, “that there can be 
no free and united Croatia without Bosnia and Herzegovina”. With this 
politics Tudjman embarked on a war to break Yugoslavia and create a large 
and independent Croat state. The result of this aspiration is an ethnically 
cleansed Croatia. By creating a state without Serbs, Croatia has come closer 
to its geostrategic goal as regards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without Serbs 
in Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, without this internal “factor of distur-
bance”, it will pounce, with more energy and fewer obstacles and hurdles, 
upon Bosnia and Herzegovina, upon Serbs and Muslims. As long as Croa-
tia and its politicians pursue the policy based on Croat state and historical 
right, they will aspire to grab hold of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and there 
will be no peace and stability in the region.  
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